Update, noon Wednesday: I’ve been sent a bit of early, unconfirmed information that as the Coastal Inspiration approached the ramp Tuesday, the propeller feathered (that is, went into “glide” position) instead of pulling into reverse, which would have slowed the ship down. Whether that’s true, and what kind of failure it represents, isn’t clear yet. I thought it was interesting enough to pass along, given the some of the wanking I’ve read around the web.
So is it just me who has some questions after one of BC Ferries’ new Super Cs rammed the loading ramp this afternoon on its way into Duke Point in Nanaimo?
It’s the second time in a month that one of their ferries has crashed into something during a landing or departure. And the fourth time this year.
The fourth time this year.
I’m wondering about some of today’s news coverage of the latest “hard landing”, as these events are known in the biz.
I’m wondering what questions reporters would ask if an airline repeatedly rammed its planes into the terminal as they taxied into place with hundreds of people on board. And they hit so hard that many of the passengers fell over, and some got hurt. And the planes were damaged. And so was part of the terminal. And it happened four times in one year. Or worse still, if they had four “hard landings” out there on the runway.
I’m wondering what they’d ask if a bus line — Greyhound, just to name one we all know — had the same problem with its coaches.
Because it really isn’t any different. It’s a question about whether companies that move passengers are doing so safely. And if they’re not, it’s a question about what’s going wrong.
This afternoon, the Coastal Inspiration hit the loading ramp hard during its approach.
According to interviews with passengers on board and people ashore, the ferry was still moving forward at a decent clip, not powering backward to slow it down, when it hit. The company says two people were hurt, the lower vehicle ramp on shore was heavily damaged — “significant” damage, it said — and the ferry suffered minor damage.
Some of the crew I talked to tonight describe it a little more graphically. One of the shore crew said the attendant on the ramp had to run flat out to get to shore because the ferry came in so hard it almost snapped the ramp off the shore structure — “he was lucky he didn’t end up in the ocean.” They said the ferry came in at what looked like five knots, with another two knots of momentum, or way, on. The ramp was smoked, there was
“huge structural damage to the cement part” and it looks like it will be at least a month before the terminal at Duke Point will be usable, they said. Many of the crew were pretty shaken up.
The earlier crashes? On Nov. 18, the Queen of Coquitlam crashed at the Departure Bay terminal in Nanaimo, likely a human error made in misjudging how to make the approach with some clutches that had been locked out during repairs. In early July, the Queen of Nanaimo crash-landed at Tsawwassen when a mechanical failure kept the ship from pulling into reverse. In that case, pins used lock parts together were replaced years ago with the wrong kind of pins, and they finally failed. On May 5, the Coastal Celebration crashed at the Swartz Bay terminal.
We’ll see what answers the company turns up in this case.
After four accidents in a year, it would be good to see someone check whether there’s any pattern here or not.
Maybe there is. Maybe not. But it’s an obvious kind of question. Maybe it’s one that the Transportation Safety Board should look at.
There’s a lot of speculation going on tonight, and to be really, really clear, it’s all just speculation.
Maybe it was something mechanical this time; crew can do everything right and the ship can let them down. Maybe a fault in the controls. Or maybe it’s an ongoing problem with the way the company does its approaches and departures — they run the ships in and out pretty hard, as one crew member pointed out in an email tonight. Maybe it has something to do with the push the company has under way to move a number of captains and senior officers out of the union and into management — which several crew told me has the effect of breaking up teams who are used to working together, and moving them around the fleet, and where not enough familiarization training is done, it’s leading to problems.
Maybe it was a combination of a lot of things.
Crap happens. It’s why smart countries make ferry companies adopt an internationally approved safety-management system, a sort of code of practices and procedures that lays out how to do things safely, and how to fix things that are found to be less than safe. It prevents crap from happening and it tries to keep it from happening twice. BC Ferries isn’t required by Ottawa to have an internationally compliant safety management system. It set one up voluntarily, at a cost of at least $20 million, years ago. And then, because safety costs a lot of money, the system fell apart. In 2006, after the Queen of the North sank and the province ordered another look at safety procedures, at least another $20 million was spent to set another safety system back up.
None of this is to second-guess an inquiry that hasn’t happened yet. Or to point fingers at anyone or anything.
It’s more to say that unless there were four totally unrelated, utterly coincidental, one-time-only problems this year, it’s important for the public to know that whatever has gone wrong is being addressed in a systematic way.
You want to know the company is serious about safety and a real safety budget.
You want to hear are things like: we take all incidents seriously, we are investigating, we acknowledge there has been a problem this year, we will be investigating all incidents and any connections between them. And doing whatever it takes to remedy the problems. Stuff like that.
Because in the end, that’s what a fully functioning safety system does. The system broke once, and a ferry sank. The company has paid plenty to reconstruct it, and Mike Corrigan, the guy who oversaw that work, is now running the show. He’s the new CEO. So it’s an issue that is fully understood at the very top levels of the company.
Rumour has it that BC Ferries management is about to declare that all is well and good with safety practices now, and that the the companies that have been helping put new safety practices into place at considerable cost can be dismissed by March.
It would be nice if the public, staring today at a three-year-old ferry that took out a loading ramp in good weather in the middle of the afternoon, can be convinced that’s wise.
You can find CBC coverage of the crash here, with a photo and some brief interviews with passengers who were on board. The Nanaimo Daily News has a story here, with more passenger comments. And you can find BC Ferries’ update on the incident tonight here.

SailSafe is about personal injuries, it is not a Safety Management System as under ISM.
As the vessels are fitted with VDR’s (similar to airplane black boxes) it should be easy to find out what or who the problem is.
What happened to BC Ferries posting the incident findings and investigations online?
What BC Ferries learned from the Queen of the North accident,
there was no consequences,
small pay out to the families,
money they received for the vessel gave a boost to their bottom line,
no one held accountable,
still able to operate single compartment vessels,
still got their bonuses
What you want to hear from BC Ferries is they have a sailor in charge not another business manager. Too many none sailors in a marine operation, there must be only a handful of people with shipboard experience in the BC Ferries main office.
Thanks, Anon.
I didn’t make that part of my post very clear. Maybe you can help.
What I meant to say is that there is an ISM Safety Management System, but Ottawa doesn’t require BC Ferries to comply. Ferries adopted it voluntarily years ago, got itself certified, bragged up a storm and then let it fall apart. My understanding was that SailSafe was the union/management program designed to return the company to safe practices, including SMS adherence. And that along the way, personal injuries would drop.
Did I get that part wrong, about restoring the SMS being one of the goals of SailSafe?
And do you have any opinions on how effective SailSafe has been? I’ve heard really mixed reviews.
Thanks.
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According to the BC Ferries spokesthingy a couple of crashes a month is no big deal because of all that….
….volume:
“I know it is unfortunate we’ve had the two incidents, but we do over 500 sailings a day,” (spokesperson Deborah) Marshall said.
Hmmmmm….
How many flights does YVR have every day? And when was the last time they had two crashes in one month?
Or four in one year?
And if they did, I think we and/or the Press would be hounding them for answers re: the fifth ‘W’.
.
Good point, Mr. K.
I did include a comment about that remark from Ms Marshall in my original post, then took it out. I had made a joke about what “two crashes in a month isn’t bad when we sail 500 times a day” means…. as in, they were saying the odds were long.
I took it down because I couldn’t quite do the math on the odds she was offering.
But I also found it a really distasteful way to respond to such a major crash, and I decided not to joke about it. They pretty much demolished a ramp, and have taken a ferry out of service for at least a month, and we’ll find out eventually why, and we’ll see if any lessons are learned.
We may even find out the cost one day, and which party pays: company? insurance company? maker of faulty part, if any?
But yeah, to add that stat on how many sailings are made every day, or month, or year, to diminish the importance of an accident, that’s bad.
It happens a lot with Ferries. It was the same thing David Hahn told me when I was interviewing him about the Oak Bay, which crashed into the marina at Horseshoe Bay a few years back. I thought it was tough then too, and a bad move on their part. I see the point they’re trying to make, but it sounds way less than professional.
And yes, I thought putting it in airplane terms made it clear just how odd it is that we’ve become accustomed to these marine accidents. Too bad, eh?
The captains at BC Ferries make the occasional hard landing due to weather, but uncontrolled landings where one of the ship’s systems fails is very rare. That is the ship fails the captain not the captain fails the ship.
If all your same model ships are having similar troubles perhaps a closer look is required.
Let us hope this electrical trouble doesn’t happen when the ship is going through Active Pass at cruising speed.
If there was a feathering issue with the Coastal Inspiration, it would have been due to the “front” prop (on the Duke Point end) failing to unfeather or feathering, uncommanded, after going into reverse.
On the double-ended ferries, the prop at the front of the ship is feathered and braked when the ship is moving. On approach to the berth, the front prop is spun up and unfeathered to stop the ship.
During docking, both the fore and aft props are operational and push the ship in opposite directions. The aft prop tries to push the ship forward against the thrust of the fore prop, which is trying to push the ship backwards. Speed control is accomplished by varying the relative thrust (via blade pitch) of the two props. Running both props is necessary to get enough water flow over the rudders to maintain steering authority at low speed.
If there had been a feathering issue with the Inspiration’s “aft” (mainland side) prop, it would have gone backwards–away from the berth.
(Not a BCFS employee.)
Thanks, Annie Mouse, that was helpful.
Lots of speculation today as the company and TSB interviews get started on what might have caused the feathering, if indeed that’s what happened. It’ll be interesting to see what surfaces. For now, much chatter about the high speed at which Ferries makes it approaches (great when all is well, not much cushion when things go wrong), and about possible failure of command system to respond when captain ordered it to (solenoid failure? no backup solenoid? etc). Luckily, all of this data is recorded, and will be critical in the investigation, and there will be an answer.
But anyway, thanks so much for the explanation. I guess the question is, why the prop stayed feathered, correct?
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