Well, nice. The discussion about that nasty ferry crash this week at Duke Point is getting interesting.
Someone is reminding us all that BC Ferries had a design choice when it built its pricey new Super Cs, and that when it made its choice, it took a gamble. This week, it lost. The propulsion system it chose — over the warnings of experts — failed. Spectacularly.
Thank you to Tidal Station for the latest reminder. And for explaining it in such readable language.
(And thank you to reader Ann who left an alternative interpretation of the issue below, in the comments section. It indicates that I may not be entirely right, and as this is an engineering issue, that’s possible. Take my post here with the grain of salt it always deserves.)
I’m glad to see the debate spread. It’s important that citizens understand the stuff they own, and the people who are planning for it, buying it, running it and looking after it on our behalf. You can never have too much clarity or too much information on public services that provide such critical transportation and cost so much money.
I’ve been pretty unhappy with the level of public debate, aka major media reports, on the mess that the Coastal Inspiration made of the ramp at Duke Point in Nanaimo when it blew in at more than five knots without any apparent control over its landing speed.
I’m unhappy not because reporters (*see note below) haven’t pried loose a definitive answer on the cause of the crash; that’s the detailed work that’s being left to the Transportation Safety Board, and they don’t weigh in until they’ve got all the loose ends tied up. I’m more concerned about the laziness, or general lack of curiosity, in asking questions and getting answers about aspects of the crash that we CAN talk about now.
Being really interested means things like stepping up and calling the “hard landing” a crash, which is what it was. It means asking about the fact there have been four alarming crashes this year. It means that when the company responds by noting there have been fewer crashes than last year and it’s only four out of 185,00 sailings that have gone bad, a reporter says: “I’m sorry, you must have misunderstood my question. I wasn’t checking the odds, I was asking about the pattern of problems during departures and arrivals, and what the company is doing to assess and remedy the matter.”
(It was worse than that. The company actually said, almost cheerfully, that there were a full 10 “hard landings” this year, and only four of them caused major inconvenience. And that because 10 is less than the 12 they average, it’s all good.)
If news outlets were doing their jobs, here’s one of the things that might have surfaced in the Globe or the Sun or on CBC or some other news outlet that citizens watch or read in common, and that might have helped people think through the problem, and debate it, and it might have forced the company and the government that owns it to do some explaining.
Reporters might have asked about this, which has been sitting on BC Ferries’ website since early April. It was posted in response to an FOI request from The Tyee, which has done a lot of good reporting on design issues on the Super Cs right from the beginning, including their huge fuel consumption. The documents were posted as part of the FOI process that mainstream reporters celebrate with such enthusiasm, and were so excited about when it was extended to the secretive body that Ferries had become. The thing about information? It doesn’t mean much til you use it.
Reporters might have asked about the fact that Ferries knew years ago it was making a design choice that might lead to just the crash that it experienced this week.
They might have asked why Ferries chose to ignore expert concerns, including those from FSG, the shipyard that built the Super Cs, and chose instead to go with an older, slightly less expensive design that it was more familiar with.
They might have asked why BC Ferries chose to gamble with its propulsion system.
Because it lost.
And that matters. It matters for the present fleet and how it’s operated, and for all the ferries we have yet to build or buy and how they’re operated.
The way managers and executives run a company is what really matters. In the end, it isn’t whether it’s a Crown corporation, or whether the subsidy is big enough, that matters most. Those things matter, but not most.
What matters is that the right decisions about what boats to buy or build, and how to run them, get made. And the only way that happens is by hiring people who know what they’re doing, who have real life, real world ferry experience.
What matters is that the way the boats are run is safe and efficient. There has been some hint that the speed at which Ferries conducts its arrivals and departures maybe an issue, for example. It sure didn’t give the captain of the ferry approaching Duke Point this week any wiggle room when, as I’ve been told, he ordered the propellers to be set to astern and got no response. And then tried to use the emergency override, and still got no response. We’ll see if any of that’s true, and what it means.
More on all that business of experienced managers later this week.
For now, we’re waiting for answers on this week’s crash, and to the immediate questions that those answers will give rise to:
For example, given the concerns that academics and outside experts expressed (and you really should read that stuff I linked to, and what The Tyee has written over the past several years), did Ferries just decide to stick with what was familiar? None of the other new ferries of that size built in the past five years use the design that Ferries chose, none of them have that propulsion system. Why? Was that not some kind of hint? Was there an overriding reason why Ferries’ needs were different and unique?
Was the person in charge of making these design choices for Ferries capable of doing so intelligently?
I don’t know why Ferries vetoed the suggestions they were given.
I don’t know as it was all about cost.
I do know they picked what they liked, and that they were used to.
Costly decision, in the end.
* I don’t really fault most reporters as individuals. I was one, for decades, and I know what they’re up against, especially these days. You work at 1,000 different assignments, each in a new area, you’re rarely given a beat any more (quaint idea, a reporter who developed expertise), and you are moved on to the next issue too fast to even think through the questions you might have about the one in front of you. The odd reporter is given the time, budget and freedom to follow the news where it goes, and if they screw up, well then, shame on them. But in general, this apparent laziness and lack of curiosity is the fault of news outlets and their owners, the folks who don’t seem to understand the responsibility that should come with ownership of the press or airwaves and worse, don’t seem to understand their own nominal product and the eagerness with which the public would consume it, given a change. Ok. Rant over…
Oh boy.
Thanks for this, and all the post present-wrapping before bed reading you’ve given us.
.
The due diligence report is rather vague about the risks involved in the Coastals’ propulsion scheme but a literal interpretation of the phrase ‘in dock’ given in their report suggests they were concerned about the potential for the controllable pitch propeller system failing while a ferry is motionless in berth at a terminal. Failure of the CPPs while in dock could result in an uncommanded departure.
My takeaway from the report is not that the engineers were warning of the type of accident that happened to the Inspiration but rather of a different failure mode that has yet to happen with a Coastal but has happened with other BCFS vessels.
BCFS’ operational procedures rely on the ability of their ferries to slow themselves with propeller thrust when approaching the berth. Any failure of the propulsion system during docking means the ferry is in trouble. It doesn’t matter whether reversing capability comes from CPPs, reversible shafts, Z-drives, or Azipods–any failure in the reversing system will result in an accident. Spending more money on variable speed, reversible, motor controls would have only made the Coastals safer if motor control is more reliable than CPP control. That’s a very hard question to answer definitively.
I think BCFS has not done enough to make sure their ferries’ engineering plants are reliable enough. This speaks more to inadequate procedures rather than to questionable design choices. Almost anything can be made reliable if it’s monitored and maintained well enough.
BCFS’ attitude towards their crash rate is completely unacceptable. An airline which pointed to the flaming wreckage of one of their aircraft after a crash and said “accidents happen” would be out of business in a week. Transport operators have to pay lip service to safety even if they don’t actually do anything about it behind the scenes.
Speaking of the airlines, globally, airline operators conduct more landings every three days than BCFS does in a year. If the airline industry had damaging hard landings at the same rate as BCFS, they’d be pulling three aircraft out of service every two days for structural repairs.
Since nobody makes public statistics available on world-wide airline accident rates, I’m not sure if the airline industry does better than this.
Ann, as always, thanks for the perspective on the reports.
You can see why reporters are people who rely on the kindness of strangers… I think things through as far as I can, and then hand my questions off to experts.
I did think the general independent assessments, together with what I learned from my own interviews with European sources, sounded like what I would think of as a warning — as in, make this decision and you’ll get something lesser. But I’ll think that through some more. And we’ll see.
Thanks again.
I will disagree with that on one particular point.
A Super C in the berth comes out of Mode 2 before discharging or loading cargo. Therefore it does not have a feathering blade set rotating against the push into the berth. Thus, a pitch control failure of the braking propeller is nonsequiter. It isn’t turning and the berth-side motor is not engaged. The consultant’s report was vague, and I will agree that they strongly cautioned against being in Mode 2 while moving vehicles. The statement in their report had everything to do with the ship running up onto the berth. That was their concern.
I have to agree that the consultant’s report was vague, but we should also remember a few things here. Glosten have been employed a few times by Martin Crilly – Ferry Commissioner, and it is written in bland consultant speak, not wishing to offend anyone, as big as BCFS, thereby jeopardize any additional work.
The second point is that the Glosten report was commission after the keel had been laid, and it did contain a lot of other interesting problems, which BCFS hadn’t worked through, and are causing problems on all 3 Super C’s still to this day.
Also, two “White Papers” were release, one by a University and another by a Consultant Engineering company both associated with FSG, proposing a different hull structure and propulsion system. There view was for 4 pods. This was rejected by BC Ferries, due the depth of the berths at the 5 major terminals in which the Super C was to work from.
As we see from Kevin Stapleton PowerPoint release, they claim that the vessels are fuel efficient which just isn’t the case. Also this was done after the vessel was build, and could be or should be viewed as more a PR exercise by BCFS. Also the diagrams used do not reflect the correct hull structure – shape as per the photographs taken by Kevin and posted on the Net
http://www.pbase.com/kstapleton/bc_ferry_german
Some photos taken during construction
Thank you Kevin for posting the links.
Here is one picture which shows the flat hull shape, which has been talked about in the Glosten report concerning the delivery of the Super C’s to BC waters, and the effect that Hull Slamming would have. http://www.pbase.com/kstapleton/image/78115614
For people that don’t know about what or how “Hull Slamming” effects the general overall operational aspects of the vessel over the years. The Strait of Georgia are not a nice flat milk pond all year round, and thereby the hull shape limits the type of weather that the Super C can operator in, as dictated by the Classification Society. We now know that the berths at the 5 major terminals are just not deep enough for the correct hull shape, which would make the vessels a lot more fuel efferent and better to handle all types of weather.
There is a combinations of trade offs in the design and build of the Super C’s, and one wonders if BCFS has taken the correct route on the trade off’s.
BC Ferries had very capable people involved with the design and implementation in the construction of the coastal class ferries.
Just because things happen it does not make it always conspiracy of clowns.
But on with the debate…
Granted Kevin, however, there were at least five people screaming from the rooftops of Hamburg that the propulsion system was being cheaped out. Let’s be honest here – if that ship were submitted for international service it would never be accepted.
In regards to experts, I would have to agree. In this case they do not appear to be at fault. It may be that they predicted this mishap and were ignored.
Good point, Kevin.
My question is whether enough problems make for a pattern, and if they do, what questions you have to answer to fix it.
I still think from all my interviews, and they were done with a lot of naval architects and engineers who work on ferry fleets worldwide, that BC Ferries made a few odd choices — mainly, the shape of the hull, and the propulsion system. I’m not sure what to make of so many experts saying the same thing, independently and from cities so far apart, other than that there might be something to what they were saying.
The whole issue of bringing in expertise from outside of BC is something I’ll write about later. I’ve wondered about that for a long time. There are a lot of practices at Ferries that are out of sync with the industry internationally — not standardizing parts or bridge layouts as much as possible, just to name two. Not building vessels that are fully compliant with international regs, for another. That would give you the option of selling ferries off before they were dead on the water.
Anyway, thanks for weighing in. Please keep the thoughts coming, even the ones that indicate I have no idea what I’m talking about… : )
The expert is just someone from out of town, I know as I am sometimes the expert.
The expert is also a convenient place to lay blame that is away from the company.
http://legacy.sname.org/sections/pacific_northwest/images/DE-Propulsion-Concept%20BCF.pdf
The link is to a power point presentation on some of the back ground to the Super C or Coastal Class design build.
http://www.sam-electronics.de/dateien/company/0.001.pdf
FSG and BC Ferries didn’t pick no name companies and equipment suppliers.
I never know if people really want to know all about building and operating a ferry or just want to vent their displeasure with BC Ferries.
That’s all well and good. I would argue that in the case of a Super C there was nothing beyond the existing C class with which to compare. It would appear BCFS rejected initial design recommendations and imposed design requirements post-SOR/TSOR which caught FSG and its contractors off-guard.
The PP presentation, as has been pointed out below, was an information exercise conducted post-construction. It didn’t address potential operating problems which many had started to raise during the build. It does however, highlight something very germane: On page 11, of the options given, Model A seems to be the most desirable (despite the fixed pitch propellers), as stated on page 12, then on page 13, with no acknowledgment of the warned risk, there is a sudden “synthesis” which eliminates the variable frequency drives and introduces constant speed motors and CPPs. It looks like the decision was based on the elimination of the cyclo converters with a big SAVINGS as the sole rationale. Where is the acknowledgment of the potential risk that simplified and cheaper drive system produces? Who decided on that system? (Not FSG. They were among the first to point out the potential problems).
I am not against the Brands that FSG and BCFS have used in the overall construction of the Super C’s, but we should remember that even GREAT brands have had trouble with their performance. I refer you to the recent Qantas Rolls-Royce engine problems.
In fact these engines were classified as so reliable, that it now has changed the route airlines are allowed to take. Previously they could only take routes, where they could land within 3 hours, but given the strength of the reliability of the “brand” of engines on certain planes, they are now allowed to take routes where they can be 5 hours away from a landing. It will change air travel in 2012.
So some brands perform, some not so. Some work great in line with other products, some not so.
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/61478229/Propeller-Design-Template
link to the FSG paper on Super C propulsion concept.
http://www.ssi.tu-harburg.de/doc/webseiten_dokumente/ssi/veroeffentlichungen/PRADS07_BCF.pdf
this one is easier to download
I’ve had my own copy of that for a very long time.
No doubt, but these are for those who might not have the files, here is another one.
http://www.dieselduck.ca/machine/02%20propulsion/2005%20BCFC%20Super%20C%20Propulsion%20Study.pdf
This way anyone else can see what articles the discussions are referring to.
Kevin, that’s lovely. It does not answer the question. Where did SAFETY become the critical factor?
We are required to deliver 100 percent of the passengers 100 percent of the time to their destination. If that means that a cheaped out system was accepted, where were the checks against that system?
Who demanded the system? (FSG argued against it)
Pretty pictures and PP presentations do not constitute a debate. Do you believe that the overriding factor in the choice of propulsion systems was passenger safety or bottom line savings?
Or is the BCFS ISM system “fucked”.
Sorry to use that from a legal document, but you aren’t in a comfortable Blue and White, “we’ve always done it that way” territory. I am not inclined to write off 193 passengers (Herald of Free Enterprise) nor six (Queen of New Westminster) condition.
I have commanded everything from a refrigerator ship to a cruise ship. I see shoddy.
Explain sir. I would never put my passengers at such risk. Explain, so that we might know.
I am not an apologist for BC Ferries nor do I speak for them in any way but since my finger was in the pie during the bringing the new vessels into operation I can try and explain what I did and the people I worked with did to ensure that you could be safe in putting your grandmother or your young child on those ferries.
Try and remember you are talking to me, not BC Ferries and the responses are just as how I see it.
I’ll check the questions to make sure I stay on track and try an answer them directly as best I can.
The checks came from the vessel being built and operated under Class, with some over sight from TC and a critical eye from the BC Ferry New Construction Team.
Other checks were an FMEA being carried out, not just the paper exercise but shipboard trials as part of the familiarization process. This way both the deck and engineer officers would know what the failure felt like and what was the best way to respond. A comprehensive familiarization program in place, with both written and practical exercises to be completed prior to obtaining vessel clearance.
Now the question is; does the current familiarization program still continue that practice, have the procedures been updated to reflect the deck and engineering officers increased knowledge of the vessel and its systems?
Yes, my finger was also in the ISM pie, so we might have found the underlying problem with BC Ferries but since I have retired a little over two years ago they should have had time to get their act together.
To be continued,